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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 








Joshua Mitzman, Esq. 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
11 Market Street, Suite 221 
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601 · 
05-020-19 B 
April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Demosthenes, Agostini 
Appellant's Letter-brief received August 26, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_ Vacated, remanded fo r de novo interview _ Modified to--- -
~med _·_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to· ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findin.P,~ of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on \ IG}Jp 11/l). 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) . 
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Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 18-month hold. The instant offense involved the appellant shooting and killing the victim after 
being ordered to by a co-defendant. Appellant, through counsel, submits a 100-page brief raising 
the following issues: 
 
1) the Board regulations, which became effective July 30, 2014, do not satisfy Executive Law § 
259-c(4) as amended;  
2) the Board failed to adequately consider Appellant’s COMPAS instrument; 
3) the Board’s decision was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious because it was based solely on 
the nature of the offense in violation of Executive Law §§ 259-i and 259-c(4);  
4) the Board failed to conduct the analysis set forth in Executive Law § 259-i; 
5) the Board’s decision was unlawful, arbitrary and capricious because the Board 
overemphasized Appellant’s prior record; 
6) the Board failed to consider all relevant statutory criteria including Appellant’s submission 
and positive accomplishments; 
7) the Board improperly considered Appellant’s  history; 
8) the determination is conclusory and fails to adequately state the basis for the decision; 
9) counsel was improperly denied access to records in that there are confidential sections of the 
Parole Board Report; 
10)  the Board improperly relied on a crime for which Appellant was not arrested or charged; 
11)  the Board acted as a sentencing judge and effectively resentenced Appellant; 
12)  the 18-month hold is excessive; 
13)  the Board was biased insofar as the panel was comprised of two members; and 
14)  the Board unlawfully abdicated its discretion and instead based its decision on an 
executive policy with respect to violent felons. 
 
The arguments are without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
Of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
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While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Murder in the second degree; Appellant’s 
criminal record , a prior state term of incarceration, and 
a violation of probation; Appellant’s institutional efforts including clean disciplinary record since 
2014, completion of ART and Phase I of Transitional Services, enrollment in a GED class, and 
work as an electrician’s helper; and release plans to live with his daughter.  The Board also had 
before it and considered, among other things, Appellant’s parole packet including letters of support 
and assurance, the sentencing minutes, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, an official 
statement from the District Attorney. 
   
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the serious instant offense that was violent, heinous, and 
showed a depraved indifference to human life and Appellant’s criminal record. See Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (3d Dept. 2014), 
affd 26 N.Y.3d 1014, 21 N.Y.S.3d 686 (2015); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 
105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 
1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
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157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990). The Board also cited official opposition to 
Appellant’s release. See Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 
2009); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of 
Walker v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter 
of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); 
Matter of Confoy v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d 
Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 
(3d Dept. 1981).  
 
Appellant’s challenge to former 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3 (2014) – which is incorrect – is misplaced 
inasmuch as the regulation was repealed in 2017.  Appellant’s additional challenge to the Board’s 
consideration of his COMPAS is without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures 
incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  
Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS 
instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 
(3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 
N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 
386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole 
indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, 
including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate 
the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is 
an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the 
purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes 
v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.  
 
Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a 
presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See 
People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People 
ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d 
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Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statuto1y commands and internal policies in 
fulfilling its obligations. See Gamer v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). 
Appellant's suggestion that the Board improperly considered Appellant's 
is without merit. 
Matter of Cobb v Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1500, 59 N.Y.S.3d 915 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Amen 
v. New York State Div., 100 A.D.3d 1230, 954 N.Y.S.2d 276 (3d Dept. 2012); Matter ofMunayv. 
Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Maliin v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 47 A.D.3d 1152, 851N.Y.S.2d664 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Waters v. New York 
State Div. ofParole, 271A.D.2d779, 706N.Y.S.2d 213 (3dDept. 2000); Matter of Pina v. Hammock, 
89 A.D.2d 799, 453 N.Y.S.2d 479 (4th Dept. 1982). 
Appellant's contention that the determination is concluso1y and fails to adequately state the basis 
for the decision is likewise without merit. The Board's decision satisfied the criteria set out in 
Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inf01m the inmate of the reasons for 
the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 
82N.Y.S.3d240 (3dDept. 2018); Matter ofKozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 
435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 
(3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); 
People ex rel. Herbe1t v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983). 
As for access to confidential sections of the Parole Board Repo1t, there was no impropriety as 
the Board may consider confidential infonnation. Matter of Molinar v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 2014). An inmate has no constitutional 
right to the info1mation in his parole file , Billiteri v. U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 
(2d Cir. 1976), and generally is not entitled to confidential material, Matter of Justice v. Cormn'r 
ofNew York State Dep'tofCon. &Cmtv. Supe1vision, 130A.D.3d 1342, 15N.Y.S.3d853 (3dDept. 
2015); Matter of Perez v. New York State Div. of Parole, 294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d 
Dept. 2002); Matter of Macklin v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 821, 711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 
2000). 
As for Appellant's contention that the inquiiy about uncharged crimes constituted an 
impe1missible factor, the Board may inquire into the circumstances of the offense, subsequent 
developments, and the inmate's state of mind consistent with the Executive Law. See, £h&, Matter of 
Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1274, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (3d 
Dept. 2014). That the Board explored Appellant's involvement in the diug trade - when the instant 
offense was committed at a location where such activity was taking place - was not improper. The 
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record reveals Appellant volunteered the information and there is no indication that the Board’s 
decision was influenced by the alleged crimes for which Appellant was not arrested or charged. 
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
The Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 18 months is within the 
Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 18 months for discretionary release was excessive or 
improper. 
 
There is nothing inherently improper about a two-member panel, which is authorized by law.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.1(b).  Inasmuch as Appellant asserts bias, there 
must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision flowed from such 
bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. 
denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000).  Here, there is no such proof.  Moreover, because 
Appellant failed to raise an objection to the complained of fact at the parole interview, this claim 
has not been preserved.  Matter of Morrison v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1073, 916 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d 
Dept. 2011); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000).    
 
Finally, there is no merit to the apparent claim that the decision was predetermined based on an 
alleged executive policy to deny parole to violent felony offenders.  Allegations that the Board has 
systematically denied parole to prisoners convicted of violent crimes have been dismissed 
repeatedly by the Courts.  See, e.g., Matter of Cartagena v. Alexander, 64 A.D.3d 841, 882 N.Y.S.2d 
735 (3d Dept.  2009); Matter of Motti v. Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1030, 831 N.Y.S.2d 298 (3d Dept. 
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2008); Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dept. 2007); 
Matter of Wood v. Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 807 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Ameyda v. Travis, 21 A.D.3d 1200, 800 N.Y.S.2d (3d Dept. 2005), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 
703, 811 N.Y.S.2d 335 (2006); Matter of Bottom v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 1027, 773 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th 
Dept.), appeal dismissed 2 N.Y.3d 822, 781 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2004). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
